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ADDRESS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) BEFORE THE VIRGINIA 
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AT WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, WEST VIRGINIA, 
AUGUST 6, 1955, ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Meeting with you here tonight is a great pleasure and 
privilege. I consider it an unusual honor /to have been 
invited to speak before such a distinguished association, 
The States of Virginia and South Carolina/ have always 1 had 
common interests and common objectives. I hope this fraternity 
will grow closer with time. Certainly, in the United States 
-~ 
Senate, I have felt a strong fraternity with the distinguished 
Senators representing you. No State is better represented 
in the Senate than Virginia /and I am happy to count Senator~~~~ 
~. f1.µ1 , 
B.y.rd and Robertson as my friends. 
The subject I wish to discuss tonight /is one about which 
I have been deeply disturbed. I know that you, too, have 
been concerned with recent events / involving the §_eparatlo~ 
of powers of the three branches of the Federal Government / 
and the division of rights between the Federal Government 
-
and the States • 
.. 
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I still believe in the United States Constitution as 
a living document, immutable except by the processes established 
when it was written~ o amend it~legall. Believing this, I 
wish to cite several provisions of this vital instrument 
-
of the American government. 
To begin with, the Constitution provides in Article I 1,i 
Section 1, that: "All legislative powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 
In view of recent developments in our jJdicial system, 
I rel± it appropriate to read this section of the Constitution 
again /as you and I have read and re-read it many times in 
the past. I hope that members of the federal judiciary/'will 
read it /and re-read it again / in the future. 
Section 8 of Article I / enumerates the powers of the 
Congress. 
Section 9 of Article r / spells out specific prohibitions 
and limitations on the powers of the Congress. 
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Section 10 of Article I / defines limitations on the 
power of the States and, further, specifies additional 
limitations which require approval of the Congress prior 
to action by the States. 
Even the clarity of these provisions did not satisfy 
ma~ of the people / when the Constitution was finally ratified 
by the nine requisite States/to become effective in 1789. 
Several States ratified only after long debate / and the 
adoption of recommendations that a Bill of Rights be added/ 
to make some of the provisions even clearer. 
A total of 124 amendments were proposed by the States 
for inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Seventeen amendments 
were accepted by the House, two of which later were rejected 
-
by the Senate. The remaining J:.2 were reduced to 12 before 
final approval by Congress. The States rejected two of the 
proposals / and thereby the Bill of Rights was distilled to 
the original 10 amendments. 
The first eight amendments listed cert~in rights 
--
specifically retained by the people. The Ninth stated 
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that the "enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall ,UQt be construed/ to deny or disparage others / retained 
by the people." 
And the Tenth Amendment declared: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
Although this amendment did not, of itself, add power 
to the States, or to the Federal Government, the Tenth 
Amendment did make clear / the intent of the framers of the 
.. - --
Constitution/ and the understanding of the States in ratifying 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
u James Madison has been quoted as saying: 
"Interference with the power of the States /~as no 
constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the 
power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if 
given, they ~igh~ exercise it, although it should ~erfere 
with the laws, or even the Constitutions of the States." 
-4-
I have no argument with that conception / of the power 
of the Congress. My contention is that legislative power, 
~ granted even to the Congress, by the Constitution or 
by statute, has been assumed by the Judiciary. By assumption 
- -
of such power, the Supreme Court has not only seized power 
granted the Legislative Branch alone, but the Court has 
also invaded the specifically reserved rights of the States. 
On occasion /a President of the United States has attempted 
to usurp power vested in the Congress. The most recent 
example was the steel seizure case. On April 8, 1952, 
President Truman issued an executive order directing the 
Secretary of Commerce / to seiz and ~erate most of the steel 
mills of the country. His purpose was to avoid a nation-wide 
strike of steel workers / during the Korean War. 
President Truman issued the seizure order "by virture 
of authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, and as President of the United States 
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United 
States ••• " 
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By a six to three opinion/the Supreme Court upheld an 
injunction of the district court / restraining the seizure. 
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in which he pointed 
out / that no statute expressly authorized or implied 
authorization/for the President to seize the steel mills; 
that in its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 
the Congress refused to authorize government seizure of 
property/as a means of preventing work · stoppages and settling 
labor disputes. He also declared that the power sought to 
be exercised was the law-making power, which the Constitution 
vests in the Congress alone. Further, he pointed out that 
such previous actions by the Chief Executive / did not thereby 
divest the Congress of its exclue!Ye law-making authority. 
Thus the Supreme Court was quick to repel / this latest 
attempt by a Chief Executive / to exercise authority not vested 
in him/ by the Constitution or by statute. 
But the Court's memory was short indeed /when it considered 
the school segregation cases. The Court itself usurped tl::e 
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power of the Congress / by its ·decision on May 17, 1954, and 
its decree of May 31, 1955. 
By this time, you are probably wondering if I am 
avoiding mention of the Fourteenth Amendment/upon which the 
appellants in the school cases depended for their argument / 
that the States could not separate the races in the public 
schools . 
I am not avoiding it . I want to discuss it with you 
tonight . 
In the first hearing, the Supreme Court asked the appellees, 
including school districts in South Carolina and Virginia, 
to present evidence at the rehearing, which was held in 
December 1953, on the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 
at the time of its enactment . Information was required on 
the gongress which ~pproved the amendment /and the ~ate~ 
which ratified it . 
The preponderance of evidence presented in the briefs 
showe*;f!he Congress which approved the amendment / and, the 
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/ 
States which ratified it, did ~ understand it as applying 
to segregation in the schools . 
As the brief in the South Carolina case pointed out, 
the "debates of the 39th Congress on the First Supplemental 
Freedman's Bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment/ contain ,!!Q ~evidence of any intention 
on the part of Congress /to forbid school segregation." 
The brief also pointed out that "of the 37 States to 
which the Amendment was submitted, only five abolished or 
-
prohibited segregation in their schools/ when they ratified 
the Amendment; and there is~; !!.S' evidence that they did so 
because they thought the Amendment required such action / 
rather than as a matter of local educational policy . Of 
these five, !Jlree later established segregated school systems / 
after the Fourteenth Amendment had become a part of the 
Constitution of the United States . " 
Nine States did not have segregated schools when the 
i-
amendment was submitted to them. 
-$-
four States, in which segregated schools were maintained 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, refused to 
ratify the amendment, but there was no evidence in the 
proceedings of their Legislatures / that they did~ do , s o / 
because of any understanding that the Amendment prohibited 
segregated SGhools. 
Two States had segregated schools and have maintained 
them. 
Nine Northern States were operating segregated schools / 
and either continued to do so or re-established them. 
seceded States continued to operate, or immediately 
re-established, segregated schools /after ratification of 
the amendment. 
Of course, I have merely touched on the strong evidence 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood / at the time 
of its ratification/ to prohibit segregated schools. But, 
the evidence was well documented in the briefs presented to 
the Court. Significantly, the evidence was not refuted. 
-9-
However, the Court saw fit largely to disregard this 
evidence for which it had asked. Commenting on the evidence, 
I 
the Court said on May 17, 1954: 
" ••• This discussion and our own investigation convince 
us / that, although these sources cast some light, it is not 
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. 
"At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents 
of the post-war amendments undoubtedly intended them /to remove 
- . 
all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized 
in the United States.' 
"Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic 
to both the letter and the spirit of the amendments /and wished 
them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress 
and the state legislatures had in mind / cannot be determined 
with any degree of certainty." 
I want you to note particularly the use of the Court's 
words "undoubtedly intended," in reference to what the 
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment thought. The Court 
cast aside the ~ evidence presented /as "inconclusive," 
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but, by some unstated power, arrived at the intent of dead 
partisans / where no evidence existed. 
-
Admitting that the question was not one of equalization 
of facilities and other "tangible" factors, the Court stated: 
"Our decision, therefore cannot turn merely on a comparison 
of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools / 
involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the 
effect of segregation itself on public education." 
This statement is clearly an admission/ that the decision 
was not rendered on the basis of any provision of the 
Constitution. Regardless of what the Court called "inconclusive" 
evidence, as to the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when it was adopted in 1868, the Court did not have to rely 
on that amendment alone / in view of the clarity of the Tenth 
Amendment. When the Court found itself in doubt as to the 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment--and its questions showed 
doubt existed--then the Court should have relied on other 
provisions of the Constitution not lacking in clarity. 
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However, the Court made its position stilLdnore untenable/ 
by its comments on the time elapsed since adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment / and the Plessy v. Ferguson decision 
of 1896, by which the doctrine of "separate but equal" school 
facilities was established. 
The Court said: 
?!We cannot turn the clock back to 1$68 when the Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was 
written. We must consider public education in the lights 
of its full development / and its present place in American 
life throughout the nation. Only in this way can it be 
determined / if segregation in public · schools / deprives these 
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." 
In other words, the Court was no longer interested in 
the evidence it had requested, regardless of the understanding 
of the Congress which approved / and the States which ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The doctrine of "separate but equal" was established 
on the Constitution, and even if the Fourteenth Amendment 
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had not existed, the doctrine would have been fair and 
equitable to apply / to the expenditure of public funds for 
public schools. No responsible official of a State government / 
would deny the obligation of the State to provide equal 
facilities for the races. Virtually all of the Southern 
States have already fully complied with that doctrine. 
In my own State of South Carolina / more funds have been 
allocated for Negro schools in the past several years / than 
for the construction of white schools. In less than four 
years, South Carolina has spent about $150,000,000 on the 
construction of new schools, with approximately 60 per cent 
being for Negroes. Since white pupils outnumber Negro 
pupils in South Carolina by three to two, this means that 
I 
approximately twice as much per capita, has been spent for 
Negro pupils for school construction. 
-
Long ago differences in teachers salaries were wiped 
out/ and salaries based on knowledge, training, and experience. 
My State is meeting the responsibility which goes with the 
Constitutional right for State regulation of public schools. 
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I know that Virginia and the other States are meeting their 
responsibility too. 
But let us consider further how the Court arrived at 
its decision/ to destroy provisions of the Constitutions 
and/or the laws of 17 States and the District of Columbia. 
It legislated by judicial fiat / in a field which even the 
Congress had not invaded. 
Thus, in this decree, the Court disregarded the 
distinctions made in the first and third articles of the 
Constitution /between the powers of the Congress and the 
Judiciary. The same decree also over-rode the eighth and 
ninth sections of Article I of the Constitution ~nd the Tenth 
Amendment, in which the rights of the States are enumerated. 
Although the Court admitted that "education is perhaps 
the most important function of State and local governments," 
it failed to~follow that thought to its logical conclusion. 
The conclusion would be that, in lieu of specific Constitutional 
or statutory limitation, the States have the power to operate 
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the kind of public schools they deem best, the equity of 
all pupils being protected. 
Quoting from the decision in the Kansas case, the Court 
stated: 
" , ••• A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of 
a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, 
therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and 
mental development of Negro children /and to deprive them of 
some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated 
school system.'" 
If this thesis had validity, the Court also should 
have treated the question of whether an adverse affect would 
result / from the mixing of children of the same age level 
of lower intelligence with those of higher intelligence. 
Certainly differences of inferiority and superiority would 
be emphasized greatly by close proximity. What would be 
the effect on the pupils of higher intelligence levels? 
Would they have to follow instruction geared to less 
intelligent pupils? Educators have long advocated that 
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greater opportunities be provided for exceptional pupils. 
They have not recommended mixing them with less able pupils. 
Still referring to the "sense of inferiority" of 
segregated pupils, the Court said: 
i~ 
"Whatever may havel\the extent of psychological knowledge 
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply 
supported by modern authority." Then, in a footnote, it 
cited a group of psychologists. Disregarding the degree 
of objectivity exercised by these psychologists, I do question 
the authority of the Court / to replace the Constitution with 
............... 
opinions expressed in textbooks. 
On May 31 of this year, the school cases were remanded 
to the district courts, leaving to them the setting of time 
for compliance. On July 15 the case which arose in Clarendon 
County, South Carolina, was heard in Columbia before a 
three-judge federal court composed of Judges John J. Parker, 
Armistead M. Dobie and George Bell Timmerman. Judges Parker 
and Timmerman had sat on the original court /which had ruled 
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that the doctrine of "separate but equal" school facilities 
for the races /was not violative of the Constitution. 
In his opening remarks at the hearing on July 15, Judge 
Parker said: 
"Whatever may have been the views of this Court as to 
the law when the case was originally before us, it is our 
duty now to accept the law as declared by the Supreme Court. 
"Having said this, it is important that we point out 
exactly what the Supreme Court has decided/ and what it has 
not decided in this case. It has .!!_O~ decided / that the federal 
courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of 
the States. It has not decided / that the States must~ 
persons of different races in the schools/ or must reguire 
them to attend schools/ or must ~eprive them of the right 
of choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, 
and all that it has decided, is that a State may not deny 
to an erson on account of race the ri ht to attend an 
school that it maintains . This, under the decision of the 
Supreme Court, the State may not do directly or indirectly / 
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but, if the schools which it maintains are open to children 
of all races, no violation of the Constitution is involved / 
even though the children of different races voluntarily 
attend different schools, as they attend different churches." 
Judge Parker's words point clearly to a means of continued 
school segregation on a voluntar pasis. Were it not for 
the agitators who have no regard for the Constitution/ and 
for the best interests of a majority of both races, I believe 
voluntary segregation would work satisfactorily. 
However, I cannot tell you that I believe it will work. 
Already petitions have been filed in several districts of 
South Carolina, since this hearing, asking for the admission 
of Negro pupils to white schools, where facilities are 
equal or better for the Negroes. The same thing is happening 
in other States. 
But permit me to quote Judge Parker further: 
"Nothing in the Constitution or the decision of the 
Supreme Court / takes away from the people / freedom to choose 
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the schools they atten~. The Constitution, in other words, 
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. 
It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result 
of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental 
power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is 
a limitation upon the exercise of power by the State or State 
agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals. 
"The Supreme Court has pointed out that the solution of 
the problem in accord with its decisions / is the primary 
responsibility of school authorities land that the function 
of the courts is to determine whether action of the school 
authorities / constitutes 'good faith implementation of the 
governing constitutional principles.' •••" 
Let me emphasize Judge Parker's statements A hat "the 
Constitution cj.oes not require integration," and that "it 
merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce 
segregation." These words are extremely important to the 
officials of the States and the schools, as we consider means 
of maintaining our way of life under the Constitution. 
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The solution to the problem lies in the hands of the 
States. While the Congress never would have been able to 
amend the Constitution, or to pass legislation, to declare 
separate school facilities discriminatory, neither could 
it now enact legislation to over-rule the action of the Court. 
There are not ehough people in Washington/ concerned 
with the same principles on which our Constitution was 
established / to pass such regulatory measures. 
Therefore, the States and school districts must construct 
laws and regulations within the principles stated by the 
Court. Not even the edict of the Court prevents the adoption 
of systems of classifying pupils / other than that of r~e. 
A friend has written me suggesting, facetiously, that 
I should introduce a bill making all legislation by the 
,.... 
Supreme Court / subject to revie_!I by the Congress. I agree 
this would be just as constitutional / as what the Court itself 
has done. 
I reject the contention of the propagandists / who have 
convinced some sincere persons that the Supreme Court has 
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spoken/ and everybody should bow to what the Court has 
declared "the law of the land." 
Those persons who sought to 'destroy the Constitution 
and the rights of the States /did not meekly bow to the doctrine 
of "separate but equal" / established under the Constitution 
by the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. Instead, for a half 
century, they conducted a propaganda campaign against the 
Constitution~ nd against the decision of a respected Oourt. 
We might do well to adopt the tactics of our opponents. 
If propaganda and psychological evidence are. effective for 
our QPponen~, they can be effective for us. Our worthy 
objective of preserving the Constitution / jus~ifies the method. 
Not only must the States find substitutes for the 
constitutional practices which have been invalidated, they 
must also fight each case / with every legal weapon at their 
- .. 
disposal. They must, at the same time, hold to the provision 
of equal facilities for the races, in spite of the temptation 
to forget humane treatment for those who exert pressures of 
propaganda and the courts. 
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In the Congress, I, for one, shall fight against every 
effort to enact legislation/which I believe discriminatory 
against the greatest minority group in this nation--the 
white people of the South--who have been subjected to abuse 
worthY of the dictators. 
I also propose to consider carefully every nomination 
made by the Chief Executive to the courts / and to other positions 
of power. If I find the appointee, by his actions and statements, 
to be disqualified for the trust he would assume, I shall t.:. 
vote ~ainst his confirmation. By this method, the Senate 
can exert its rightful power / in an effort topprotect: the 
Constitution against further inroads. 
I deem it my duty, my solemn obligation, under my oath, 
to take such action to defend the Constitution of the United 
States. 
The process of adaptation of the Constitution to cha~ing 
times had attained a speed so great / that in Smith v. Allwright 
in 1944, the late Justice Roberts declared that Supreme 
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• 
Court decisions appeared to have taken on the attributes 
of restricted railroad tickets, valid only for the ~ e of 
their issuance. 
As attorneys, you probably know that in the 18 years 
since 1937, 22. previously formulated principles of constitutional 
law /have been discarded or ~ver-rule~ by the Supreme Court. 
In the preceding 137 years of this nation under the Constitution, 
- -
only 29 previously established principles /were over-ruled. 
From the beginning, the lawyers of this country have 
had a strong hand in making it a great nation. Of the 56 
-
men who signed the Declaration of Independence,~ were 
lawyers. T!"enty-on~ of the 3? delegates who drafted and 
signed the Constitution also were lawyers. A high percentage 
~~o.. ~ I 
of the members of ~heAState legislatures today/ are lawyers. 
No other profession has contributed so much / to the establishment 
and the maintenance of our Government. 
As your able and devoted forefathers fought the fights 
of liberty---on the battlefields and in the law-making bodies~ 
I hope you will devote your legal talents to preserving the 
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guarantees of the Constitution. We have seen in other lands/ 
what gappens to the rights of the people/ ~hen ~uly constituted 
government is destroyed. 
We cannot flinch / at being charged with "impeding progress." 
-
The Supreme Court/ by its decree / has impeded the progress 
made in 75 years of work/~eq~al and adequate public 
education for the white and Negro children of the South. 
No accuser can point his finger in any other direction with 
-
as much accuracy. 
-
TH.I!: END 
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